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1 Introduction
Appropriate regulatory responses to recurring crises are a persistent problem of capitalism. 
In the period of economic upturn preceding the current crisis, developed countries’ capital 
markets seemingly worked with incredible efficiency. This created the moral foundation 
for deregulation. The nightmare of recession seemed unrealistic, and the stringency of 
the regulatory environment started to ease, amidst general optimism. However, the crisis 
proved that the processes of recent decades and the increasing complexity of financial 
markets did not bring increasing profits with decreasing risks, as experts from financial 
institutions led us to believe. The two key reasons of the crisis are markets turning 
opaque due to the proliferation of financial innovations, and the inappropriate regulatory 
environment (Biedermann, 2012a).
Post-crisis regulation is fundamentally different from that of a more balanced financial and 
economic era. Since public trust in financial institutions and markets decreased rapidly 
after 2007, policymakers were pushed to re-evaluate their share in the creation of the 
global economic turmoil. Although there are other increasingly important actors in the 
global financial markets, in this article we devote particular attention to the regulatory 
changes in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). In response to the recent 
financial crisis, extensive legislative initiatives were undertaken in many jurisdictions, 
most notably in the US and the EU, as well as at the international level. This was often 
accompanied by revamping of existing institutions such as the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervisors and the introduction of new organisations such as the Financial Stability Board 
(Chatzistavrou et al., 2013).
The interconnectedness of financial markets was exposed in light of the recent financial 
and economic crisis; therefore, several regulatory initiatives of the financial markets have 
been pushed to the forefront of the global economic cooperation agenda (G20, Bank 
for International Settlements, the Financial Action Task Force) at the level of political 
principals (Véron, 2014). The worldwide impact of the economic crisis on financial market 
regulation has forced US and EU regulators and policymakers to adjust their role in the 
context of a more interconnected global arena. However, these adjustments have been 
unbalanced. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic were forced to rethink the means 
of financial regulation, and realize that “national interests can no longer dominate; rather, 
these interests must be harmonised” (Stoltenberg et al., 2011:578–579). Reaching this 
theoretical conclusion is not enough, as there are practical steps and legal processes that 
need to be implemented to create a harmonised environment for financial firms operating 
in both the EU and the US.
Rule-makers try to avoid regulatory arbitrage by calling for consistency in implementing 
G20 and other reforms. However, introducing identical or similar requirements in 
different jurisdictions may lead to some actors becoming subject to multiple overlapping 
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regulatory regimes. The effects could be the following: reducing the quality or usefulness 
of information available to regulators; introducing unnecessarily duplicate requirements 
and distorting competition; encouraging participants to make venue choices based on 
avoidance of administrative complexity; and increasing the compliance burden or costs of 
compliance for regulated entities without achieving any additional benefits (GFMA, 2012).
This article evaluates and compares the latest financial regulation initiatives on both sides 
of the Atlantic, and reflects diverging attitudes to regulation in the EU and the United 
States. Fundamental differences in regulation pose a challenge to firms operating in both 
environments, and although the present overhaul would be a unique opportunity for the 
creation of a uniform global financial regulation, it remains elusive to this day.
2 Theoretical framework for financial 
regulation
This section provides a theoretical background of financial market regulation. Financial 
market regulation is the subject of fierce debate, for instance on the issue of ideal capital 
requirement levels (Dewatripont – Tirole, 1994; Goodhart et al., 1998; or Acharya et al., 
2010). Acharya et al. (2010) presents that excessive regulation involves costs, but the 
effects, even an unleashed disaster can be observed ex-post only. According to Šútorová 
and Teplý (2014), “It implies that optimal regulation should be the art of balancing the 
immeasurable against the unknowable. As a result, effective financial market regulation 
is basically a ‘mission impossible’ and recurring crises can be still expected in the future”. 
In the case of financial regulation, it must be highlighted that, despite its importance, 
global regulatory efforts will not be able to prevent financial markets from future crises 
and financial upheavals on their own (Reinhart–Rogoff, 2009; Acharya et al., 2010).
As for the goals, on the one hand regulation should ensure the safety and stability of 
the financial system (including the promotion of consumer protection as well), and on 
the other hand it should foster the growth and development of the financial markets. 
Consequently, financial regulation should be “focused, primarily rule-based and time 
and state-varying (light during normal periods, increasing as systemic threats build up)” 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009:59). Globalisation of financial markets manifests itself in the 
increasing interconnectedness and interchangeability of financial service providers, which 
makes financial regulation even more problematic (Pan, 2011). Rather than being based 
on a consistent theoretical framework, financial regulation is usually imposed in reaction 
to some previous crisis. This area has always involved “a pragmatic response by practical 
officials, and concerned politicians, to immediate problems, following the dictum that – 
We must not let that happen again” (Goodhart, 2010:165).
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A fundamental reconsideration of global financial regulation has occurred as a response 
to the crisis. In the aftermath, policymakers seemed more concerned about stability issues 
rather than financial markets’ competitiveness. On the contrary, faced with a sluggish 
recovery, governments are now trying to make sure achieving one goal does not occur at 
the expense of the other (Pan, 2011).
It is extremely difficult to balance between financial lobbies, the public will and the 
haunting image of a global crisis relapse. Financial regulatory responses to the current 
crisis need to take into account domestic, but also regional and global, features of the 
financial system. This resulted in somewhat different alterations of the previous regulatory 
frameworks in Europe and America which need ulterior follow-up and coordination. Since 
regulatory arbitrage may hinder global recovery, reforms to achieve global financial stability 
seem more important than ever. The required reforms “mitigating systemic (as opposed to 
idiosyncratic) risk; alterations in incentive structures; and better data and information to 
reduce unknowns” are independent, and any set of reforms may only marginally improve 
global financial stability (Claessens–Kodres, 2014:15).
3 Comparing EU and US responses
It is obvious that the EU and the US play a central role in shaping global finance, as they 
account for more than two-thirds of all financial services by transaction volumes. Although 
ties between the two financial markets are almost organic, there are several issues which 
are being tackled in a fundamentally different manner (CMWG, 2010). The financial crisis 
triggered a wave of new regulations worldwide “to make markets and institutions more 
transparent, less complex, and less leveraged” (IMF, 2012:75). Post-crisis amendments 
highlight the divergence of regulatory approaches in the United States and the European 
Union, since the American Dodd-Frank Act is more of an all-encompassing law, while the 
EU is methodically regulating sector by sector (The Economist, 2012).
The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) is the US legislative response to the financial crisis, which 
implements the measures agreed on at international level by the G20 and elaborated 
further by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Sabel, 2012). American president Barack Obama announced his intention to reform the 
American financial sector in June 2009 and signed the Dodd-Frank Act on Wall Street 
reform and consumer protection a year later. The stated aim of the legislation was “to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, 
and for other purposes.” As any major financial reform, it received harsh criticism, some 
arguing that its measures were not sufficient to prevent a similar financial crisis, others 
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contending that it was too rigid and reduced the competitiveness of American financial 
firms. Furthermore, large financial firms giving financial advice and performing various 
financial operations on their own account, representing the classic case of conflict of 
interest, are required to put their clients’ interests first. However, this theoretical norm 
will be difficult to respect since consulting and trading on an own account within the same 
firm is still considered legal.
The Dodd-Frank Act (among others) introduced a watered-down version of the Volcker 
Rule (originally intended to restrict banks from trading on their own account as well as 
making speculative investments in risky funds): banks are only allowed to make higher 
risk investments with up to 3% of their tier 1 capital. Neither can banks possess more 
than a 3% stake in any private equity group or hedge fund. The 3% capital threshold 
is probably not strict enough to limit banks’ risky activities and proprietary trading. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also introduced transparency reforms for the derivatives market, and 
comprehensive regulation of swaps, without removing the possibility of excessive leverage 
from the system. The EU proposed initiatives similar to the Volcker Rule. The structural 
measures submitted by the US (Volcker Rule), UK (ring-fencing1), and EU (Liikanen group 
recommendations/banking structural reform proposal) aim to decrease the probability of 
bank failure and its systemic implications by reducing complexity and interconnectedness. 
The Liikanen Report highlighted the need for re-structuring of banks into separate legal 
entities (Viñals et al., 2013) and as a follow-up to the Liikanen report, the Commission 
established a High-level Expert Group to examine possible reforms to the structure of 
the EU’s banking sector. The Group’s mandate was to determine whether, in addition to 
ongoing regulatory reforms, structural reforms of EU banks would strengthen financial 
stability and improve efficiency and consumer protection, and, if so, to make proposals as 
appropriate. The Commission examined the possible reform options and their implications 
and, on January 2014, it adopted a proposal for a regulation (European Commission, 
2014a).
The EU took a three-pronged approach based partially on the European Markets 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) as a cornerstone of the post-crisis reform agenda. 
Together with the revisions to Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and 
the increased capital requirements for banks (CRD IV2 implementing Basel III3), these 
1 Ring-fencing promotes resolvability at the level of the retail bank, but not necessarily at the group level.
2 “In 2013, the European Union adopted a legislative package to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector and 
to implement the Basel III agreement in the EU legal framework. The new package replaces the current Capital 
Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49) with a Directive and a Regulation and is a major step towards 
creating a sounder and safer financial system… The package is due to enter into force on 1 January 2014” (EBA, 
2013).
3 “Basel III”, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is a cornerstone in the overhaul of banking 
regulation to achieve stricter supervision and risk management of the banking sector. The financial crisis revealed 
certain procyclical elements of banking regulation, and accordingly Basel III aims to mitigate the procyclical nature 
of the regulatory framework, while strengthening bank capital requirements and introducing new regulatory 
requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage (Ernst and Young, 2010).
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three packages will dramatically alter the current operation of financial markets in Europe 
(Deloitte, 2012).
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) was adopted in 2012 by the 
European Parliament and Council to improve transparency and risk management on the 
“over the counter” (OTC) derivatives market. EMIR stipulates that OTC derivative contracts 
(with some exceptions) must be reported and cleared (unless they are below the clearing 
threshold). It also sets additional safety measures for central clearing counterparties and 
trade repositories (ESMA, 2013).
EMIR concentrates on the post-trade regulation of OTC contracts, but pre-trade and trade-
related aspects of OTC regulation were also under review. The European Council concluded 
an agreement regarding the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) review in 
June 2013, based on the original aims of making financial markets more efficient, resilient 
and transparent and investor protection more robust (Ernst and Young, 2013). As a result 
of the original MiFID, which had to be implemented by 2007, European financial markets 
became more fragmented, with trading taking place on a growing number of platforms. 
MiFID also contributed to more intense over-the-counter trading and the development 
of dark pools, and consequently market transparency decreased. The new regulation 
proposes the notion of OTF (Organised Trading Facilities) to include platforms that are not 
yet regulated. It tries to move the trading of derivative contracts to trading venues, and to 
broaden pre and post-trade transparency rules from listed shares to all instruments (ABBL, 
2013). MiFID II also aims to restrict high-frequency trading and excessive speculation on 
commodity derivatives and improve consumer protection for retail investors who buy 
financial products (Finance Watch, 2013).
Banks, businesses and financial service providers will have to make strategic choices to 
comply with the new legislation on both sides of the Atlantic. But fragmentation of the 
global financial space seems inevitable, as both European and American regulation and 
implementation processes are speeding up and gradually taking final shape.
When we try to compare the European and American financial frameworks, we must 
emphasise the different political background: in Europe, the financial crisis has become 
a sovereign debt crisis. The EU is trying to regulate its financial sector while stabilising 
collapsing banks and euro-area Member States one after the other. Moreover, while 
the United States is more or less coherent and homogenous, the EU is composed of 28 
Member States with widely varying interests, making the legislation process slower and the 
end result more fragmented. When it comes to financial regulation, the United Kingdom, 
as the second most important financial centre after the United States, is often opposed to 
regulation it considers too rigid and detailed.4 Prime Minister David Cameron expressed 
4 Based on the interview with Rita Pupli, Financial Department officer at the Ministry for National Economy.
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fears in October 2011 claiming that London’s financial centre is under “constant attack 
through Brussels directives.”5
The following part of the study aims at highlighting differences and similarities of post-crisis 
financial regulation on both sides of the Atlantic associated with certain key phenomena 
linked directly to the financial crisis after 2007.
4 Regulatory changes on both sides 
of the Atlantic
We decided to analyse similarities and differences in these six areas, as these key aspects 
reflect how determined policymakers are to change the flawed logic and systemic problems 
of pre-crisis financial regulation. At the same time, these are the major areas where the 
two financial systems can be easily compared based on the text of the legislations, but 
also on press releases and analyses resulting from regular talks and discussions the two 
jurisdictions are having in order to harmonise their systems. For the purpose of highlighting 
the main differences between the US and EU approaches, we compare the regulatory 
responses in six exemplary areas: remuneration, bank capital requirements, derivatives, 
credit rating agencies, the regulation of hedge funds, and consumer protection.
Remuneration requirements have attracted significant popular and political attention. 
Excessive, poorly structured remuneration in financial institutions has been considered 
as an important ingredient in the development of the global financial crisis. Credit ratings 
agencies have also been subject to substantial criticism, due to conflicts of interest arising 
from their business revenue models, and the poor predictive ability of ratings has also 
been a cause for concerns (Davis, 2011). Bank capital requirements as macroprudential 
policy tools are gaining more and more attention, since policymakers aim to use these 
tools to reduce the pro-cyclicality of credit and leverage (Yellen, 2010; Hanson et al., 
2011). Creating a new regulatory framework for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives is an 
important element of financial regulation, because during the financial crisis, derivatives 
were portrayed as exacerbating stress in the financial system and global economy. As 
a result, policymakers set themselves the goal of building a more robust, transparent 
framework for the global derivatives markets (Oudéa, 2013). Hedge funds played a central 
role in generating systemic risk during the crisis, and thus changes to their regulation is 
a crucial element of financial regulation (Gropp, 2014). According to the findings of Adams, 
Füss and Gropp (2014), it can be concluded that hedge funds may be the most important 
5 Reuters: UK threatens veto over EU financial regulation. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 2011/11/08/
uk-britain-financial-hoban-idUKTRE7A74WO20111108 (accessed on 23.03.2013).
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transmitters of shocks during crises, being more important than commercial banks or 
investment banks. Evans (2010) argues that regulatory intervention in consumer protection 
is an attractive option for policymakers to raise public attention. The global financial crisis 
has highlighted the need for strong consumer protection and financial literacy. As a result, 
governments worldwide are looking at practical and effective ways of improving consumer 
protection in financial services (Rutledge, 2010).
4.1 Remuneration
Before the crisis, the incentive systems of numerous financial firms prompted both financial 
institution executives and employees to undertake short-term risks, instead of taking into 
consideration the interests of their depositors/shareholders and maintaining sustainable 
profitability in the long term. Rewards were tied to the success of the company on the 
market. The indicators of success in this field usually involved market share figures (number 
of new contracts, income, and profit), increase in client numbers, etc. As a result, lending 
standards became progressively laxer and contracting volumes were exaggerated (clients 
were talked into well rated, but rather risky deals) in the hopes of attaining higher bonuses. 
Even if a financial company or a bank went bankrupt, managers were not obliged to repay 
their bonuses, moreover: several top executives were paid excessive severance payments 
(golden parachutes). Many executives tried to conceal the company’s liquidity problems 
(with the help of auditors and credit rating agencies) until the last minute (Biedermann, 
2012b). The above described routine contributed significantly to a so-called “boom frenzy” 
which ultimately led to massive irresponsible financial behaviour.
American legislation tackled the issue in a soft manner. The Dodd-Frank Act prescribes 
a shareholder vote on executive compensation. Pursuant to the Act’s provisions, joint-
stock companies shall in their proxy statements, at least once every three years, request 
shareholders to take a vote to approve the compensation of executives. The result of the 
vote, however, is not binding for management. The vote on compensation also requires 
that in the event that shareholders are asked to approve an acquisition, merger, proposed 
sale, etc., the person making such solicitation shall also disclose how much compensation 
corporate executives will receive due to the given transaction. These vote results are also 
non-binding (Fried–Shilon, 2012).
By contrast, the EU took harsher measures to cap bankers’ bonuses. The CRD IV package, 
containing the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR), specifies provisions regarding the compensation policies of financial 
institutions, including a “bonus cap”. The British government sought annulment of the 
remuneration-related requirements, but as of early 2015, due to the “minimal prospects 
for success”, it decided not to pursue the case any longer (Osborne, 2014). Although 
capping bonuses may be effective in fighting short-sighted manager strategies, they might 
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result in increasing fixed salaries or drive away talent. If an exodus of bankers takes place, 
the City of London may lose ground to New York and Asian financial centres.
4.2 Capital requirements
The relative importance of banks in the world economy in the last two hundred years has been 
on the rise; from financial intermediaries channelling savings into productive activities, they 
have become fundamental players in most developed countries, boosting or slowing down 
a country’s economic performance. This process gathered pace in the decades preceding 
the current crisis. The scale of banking grew rapidly: between 1870 and 1970, the average 
bank assets-to-GDP ratio rose from 16% to over 70% per cent. In the roughly 40 years since 
1970, the ratio of bank assets-to-GDP has more than doubled, rising from around 70% to over 
200% (Haldane, 2012). Banking concentration has also risen dramatically, contributing to the 
evolution of banks that are systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
The existence of SIFIs involves a three-fold policy challenge. First, such institutions are 
responsible for systemic risk by blunting incentives to manage risks prudently and by 
creating a massive contingent liability for governments. Second, SIFIs distort competition. 
And third, the favoured treatment of SIFIs lowers public trust in the fairness of the system 
(Goldstein–Véron, 2011).
The operation of banks has its innate risks due to the nature of their activity. Because 
of the maturity mismatch between bank assets and liabilities, banks are subject to the 
possibility of runs and systemic risk (Allen–Carletti, 2009). Bank regulation is designed to 
minimise these risks stemming from the characteristics of banking activities. The relatively 
lax and pro-cyclical regulatory environment, as well as the moral hazard related to SIFIs 
encouraged banks’ risk-taking and expanded banks’ range of activities from the 1980s on 
(Taylor, 2012). The operation of banks became riskier, as they used excessive leveraging 
and started lending to less reliable customers. The hallmark of this excessive risk-taking 
was loans to NINJA (No Income No Job or Assets) customers, who then started to default 
in significant magnitudes (Talbott, 2010). The above phenomena are widely considered 
to have contributed to the global financial crisis.
Reforming minimum capital requirements for banks and certain financial service providers 
aims to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector, which proved to be insufficient 
during the crisis. The ratio between the capital a bank must retain and the risks it incurs 
in its activities are defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the 
international level. The first Basel Accords were published in 1988 by central bankers 
from all around the world and were enforced in the Group of Ten countries in 1992 (BIS, 
2009). Due to swift transformation in the financial sphere in the following two decades, 
a more comprehensive, better adapted set of risk and capital management requirements 
was published by the BCBS in 2004 (Basel II) and implemented gradually in most G20 
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countries by 2010 (BIS, 2013), when Basel III was developed to address shortcomings of 
the previous regulatory framework revealed by the financial crisis (Elliott, 2010a).6
Basel III improves the quality and quantity of capital retained by banks in order to better 
absorb shocks,7 introduces a counter-cyclical buffer that can be used in times of crisis,8 
an additional non-risk weighted leverage ratio and liquidity coverage ratio to be met, 
and strengthens risk capture and risk management practices. Since Basel III is not legally 
binding, the Basel Committee member countries are entitled to implement it in their 
own way, respecting the spirit of Basel III as a general basis. The implementation of Basel 
III rules is therefore advancing very slowly and unevenly. The progressive “phase in” of 
specific provisions, particularly on liquidity and leverage, are likely to influence the relative 
competitiveness of US and EU financial institutions.
Both American and European regulators face fierce resistance from bankers who claim 
to need a longer period of preparation to implement the required changes (EBIC, 2013). 
Although the Basel III capital proposals have promising elements, including a leverage ratio, 
a capital buffer and a mechanism to deal with pro-cyclicality through dynamic provisioning 
based on expected losses, it might face the same fate as Basel II which never properly 
came into effect.9
While in the EU the CRD IV framework applies to all credit institutions and investment 
firms, in the United States the scope of implementation is narrower: smaller bank holding 
companies and some savings and loans companies will be exempt from the relevant 
provisions. While some EU requirements are more liberal, others are more rigorous 
(scope of application of the Basel framework, capital buffers and eligibility criteria for 
recognising real estate collateral) as compared to the minimum requirements stipulated in 
the Basel III framework. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision assessed European 
implementation,10 and claimed it to be materially non-compliant with the minimum 
standards of Basel III, deviating from both the letter and the spirit of the Basel framework. 
Special emphasis is put on the methodology used to calculate CVA risk capital requirements 
(BiS, 2014). The identified deviations, especially those more rigorous than US Final Rules,11 
might pose serious challenges for financial institutions operating in both environments.
6 Basel II did not enter into force until January 2008 in the EU and April 2010 in the US. In response to the crisis and 
to remedy some shortcomings of Basel II, the BCBS adopted the Basel III Accord in September 2010 (Paulo, 2011).
7 The definition of what counts as ”Tier I” capital is also stricter.
8 Basel II was criticised for being pro-cyclical from the start (minimum capital requirements were usually 
underestimated in boom periods, and banks could not go below the minimum capital requirements even in times 
of crisis).
9 In the United States, Basel II was never fully implemented, and therefore the Final US Rules will replace a Basel 
I-based capital system.
10 For the full implementation of CRD IV and the CRR, the EU relies upon the timely issuance of EBA standards and 
guidelines.
11 In July 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”) and other bank 
regulatory agencies approved final rules (“Final US Rules”) which codify the US Federal regulatory agencies’ 
regulatory capital rules into a single, comprehensive regulatory framework (Sabel, 2013).
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The different accounting standards which are applied in the US and the EU make the 
comparison of capital requirements all the more difficult.12 In relation to some elements 
of a bank’s balance sheet, IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) and US GAAP 
(US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) are totally incomparable (Lannoo, 2010a).
Another serious problem lies in the very nature of the financial system. The Basel regulatory 
framework can only regulate banks. However, banks can shift financial “promises” to non-
regulated or less-regulated insurance companies in various jurisdictions. There are several 
other actors on the financial market that might act like banks (e.g. some hedge funds issue 
securities in their own name and take deposits of investors and invest with leverage on 
behalf of investors). This shadow banking system does not operate according to the same 
rules as the banking system does (Blundell et al., 2010).
Hence, even if stricter rules are applied to banks, other bank-related and shadow banking 
institutions will continue operating outside these rules, and previously well regulated 
banking activities might be taken over. In other words, the new banking standards may 
encourage certain activities to move to the nonbank sector, where banking standards do 
not apply (IMF, 2012).
4.3 Derivatives
A derivative security (forwards, swaps, futures, options) generally refers to a financial 
contract whose value is derived from the value of an underlying asset. Derivatives allow 
users to meet the demand for cost-effective protection against risks associated with 
movements in the prices of the underlying, and thus users of derivatives can hedge against 
fluctuations in exchange and interest rates, equity and commodity prices, as well as credit 
worthiness. The derivatives market has skyrocketed during the last 25 years, and the rapid 
improvements in computer technology in the 1990s allowed asset managers to design and 
develop increasingly sophisticated derivatives as part of their risk management tools (Chui, 
2012). They generally ensured much higher yields before the crisis than deposit interest, 
and offered a wide range of investment opportunities with high returns compared to 
the amount invested. This, however, was not due to the ”risk-free” nature of derivatives 
transactions, but rather to the overly optimistic speculations related to such. Due to 
high leveraging, investors can lose multiples of their original investment if they take up 
unfavourable speculative positions (Biedermann, 2012a).
Moreover, a flourishing market in derivative products developed outside the regulated 
markets (over-the-counter, OTC), under significantly more ”unregulated” conditions, which 
made the markets more opaque. According to Paulo (2011), almost 90% of derivatives are 
not traded on regulated markets, but over the counter.
12 The EU has adopted IFRS, whereas the US continues to apply its own standards (US GAAP).
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The financial crisis was seriously aggravated by the excessive use of derivatives such as 
credit default swaps (CDS) for speculative purposes, instead their use for hedging existing 
risks (Elliott, 2010b). The lack of appropriate regulation of OTC derivatives transactions and 
insufficient risk aversion are addressed both in the European and American regulatory efforts.
There is a general effort to bring to light as many transactions that were previously 
concluded on unregulated platforms as possible. In Europe, standardised derivatives 
will have to take place on MTFs (multi-lateral trading facilities), in the US on SEFs (Swap 
Execution Facilities) and reduce counterparty risk by obligating trading parties to clear 
transactions via a central counterparty.13 The key requirements regarding derivatives 
are by and large the same in the European (EMIR) and American (Dodd-Frank Act, 
Title VII) regimes both regarding trade data and clearing requirements. These rules are 
compulsory for both financial and non-financial companies which conclude more than 
a certain threshold number of derivative transactions. Both jurisdictions granted a wide 
exemption for commercial users of derivatives who are hedging their underlying business 
risks (Deloitte, 2012).
However, while the frameworks are very similar, there are significant differences in 
implementation and technical details. Jones (2014) wrote about a Transatlantic tug-of-
war over derivatives, since both the EU and the United States reiterated their commitment 
several times to bring about a coherent and smooth global market of derivatives 
(Path Forward,14 Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue15 press releases16) and still no 
compromise is in sight. United States CCPs are still not allowed to clear EU derivatives 
contracts without the added cost of complying with European rules as well. Another key 
challenge is minimising divergences with regard to margin for uncleared swaps.
Moreover, whereas US capital markets are more alike, the European financial landscape 
is far from being homogeneous. The fragmentation of European markets pose challenges 
(among others) to the regulation of central counterparties (CCPs). According to the 
13 A central counterparty stands between two parties, guaranteeing a trade if one party defaults.
14 In 2013, EU and United States regulators signed the “Path Forward” agreement, a promise to harmonise their 
derivatives rules in an attempt to avoid fragmenting the sector.
15 The Financial Market Regulatory Dialogue has been the forum for discussion of EU and US regulators since 2002. It 
brings together representatives of the European Commission (DG MARKT), the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs – European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, European Securities 
and Markets Authority) and the US Treasury and independent regulatory agencies, including the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The members of the EU-US regulatory dialogue hold 
regular exchange of information on regulatory developments on both sides of the Atlantic.
16 United States (U.S.) – European Union (EU) Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement of 15 January, 
2015: “Participants highlighted EU and US efforts to implement OTC derivatives reforms and their continued efforts 
to settle remaining issues related to cross-border market participants, transactions, and infrastructures. Both sides 
welcomed the extension of the transitional period for capital requirements for exposures to central counterparties 
(CCPs). The extension allows the EU to continue to engage with CFTC and SEC staffs to move forward on equivalence 
decisions for US CCPs. EC and CFTC staffs committed to resolving soon issues related to equivalence for US-based 
CCPs under the European Markets and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) on the basis of an effective system of 
substituted compliance for dually-registered CCPs” (p. 2.)
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European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH), an umbrella group for Europe’s 
23 clearing houses, European requirements are more onerous (more expensive and 
burdensome) than American ones, which might undermine the competitiveness of 
European CCPs, putting them at a regulatory disadvantage and encouraging regulatory 
arbitrage.
As for the differences in EMIR’s effect, according to Károly Mátrai, director (Risk 
Management and Economy) of the Hungarian central clearing house (KELER), some 
provisions might raise serious difficulties for the operation of smaller clearing houses.17
4.4 Credit rating agencies
The importance of the analysis of credit ratings agencies (hereinafter referred to as CRAs) 
stems from the consensus on blaming them for part of the financial crisis (Lannoo, 2010a). 
The market is currently dominated by three large credit rating agencies, which reign over 
94% of the global market (European Commission, 2008). They had already erred in their 
forecasts on a number of occasions before and at the beginning of the mortgage crisis, 
and rated securities and credit products which soon lost their value, as excellent. Moody’s, 
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s gave premium category ratings even to those collateralised 
debt obligations, the underlying subprime mortgagors of which were already insolvent. 
Between the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008, the rating of several securities 
changed from AAA (obligation will be met with a very high probability) to CCC (significant 
credit risk) over the course of a single day (in the period in question, mortgage-backed 
securities were downgraded in a total value of USD 1.9 trillion) (Morris, 2008).
Many institutions were only allowed to have a certain ratio of low-rated investments and 
were forced to start selling following the downgrade. Those who could have purchased 
were unable to do so due to strict regulations. It was therefore the system itself which 
reinforced negative feedback and elevated panic. What is of more concern is the conflict 
of interest that arises in the advisory business of CRAs. The advisory arms of CRAs might 
help potential issuers gain a desired rating. Therefore, it would be desirable to legally 
separate the ratings business from ratings advisory services (Brunnermeier et al., 2009).
Implementation of the regulation differs significantly between the US and the EU. In spite 
of extensive US-EU dialogue on financial regulation, regulation of the CRAs remains an 
area of fundamental divergence between the two parties. The key differences in the two 
approaches stem from different perception of the rating business. US authorities prefer 
market discipline through transparency and competition, establishing a state-sanctioned 
oligopoly, in which the basis of competition will be the quality of ratings. By contrast, EU 
17 Based on the interview with Károly Mátrai (21st March, 2013).
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authorities aim to promote CRAs’ accountability through supervision, while raising barriers 
of entry into the rating business (Lannoo, 2010b).
US regulation has employed credit ratings since the 1930s without supervising CRAs, in 
response to the 1929 market crash. Between the 1930s and the 1970s, the use of ratings 
in regulation did not change significantly; consequently the US regulation has grown to 
be highly dependent upon ratings in areas such as securities, pensions, banking, real 
estate, and insurance (Cinquegrana, 2009). However, in light of the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis and mounting evidence of the responsibility of CRAs in the debacle, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission – in the hope of reducing the overwhelming 
influence of CRAs over US and global economy – decided in 2011 to try and erase 
compulsory reliance on credit rating agencies from financial regulation rulebooks where 
possible. The overall aim is “to remove or replace all references to CRA ratings in laws and 
regulations and give alternatives where possible” (Finance and Strategy, 2013). The new 
rules also support financial market actors to elaborate their own credit assessments. 
The EU has also taken significant steps to remove the hard wiring of CRA ratings from 
its rules and regulations through the adoption of the CRA III Regulation (FSB, 2013). Just 
like in the United States, rating agencies can be held liable if their reports cause damage 
to an investor or an issuer due to infringement of CRA Regulation or gross negligence. 
The third CRA package also tries to reduce overreliance by encouraging self-assessment 
of financial institutions. The Regulation will improve the independence of CRAs and help 
eliminate conflicts of interest by introducing mandatory rotation for certain complex 
structured financial instruments (re-securitisations). There are also limitations as regards 
the shareholding of rating agencies. The EU is also supporting the use of smaller CRAs in 
order to reduce high market concentration of the three largest agencies. To mitigate the 
risk of conflicts of interest, the new rules also prohibit a shareholder of a CRA with 10% or 
more of the capital or voting rights from holding 10% or more of a rated entity (European 
Commission, 2013). The issue of the third-country regime was the most debated point 
during the negotiation of the CRA Regulation, that is why the 2012 decision of the EU 
to recognise the legal and supervisory framework of the US for credit rating agencies as 
equivalent to the EU requirements came as a surprise for many observers.
4.5 Supervision of hedge funds
Hedge funds were blamed for their part in the crisis, but their real role is unclear. Hedge 
funds have fewer assets and less leverage than banks, making it less likely that hedge funds 
might cause the next crisis. As already mentioned, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act restricts 
a banking entity from having an ownership interest in or being a sponsor of a private equity 
or hedge fund if such investments amount to more than 3% of the bank’s Tier 1 capital 
or the bank’s interest is more than 3% of the total ownership of the fund (Kaal, 2010).
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Hedge funds with more than USD 150 million in Assets Under Management (AUM) are 
required to register as investment advisers and must disclose information on their trades 
and portfolios to the SEC (Securities and Exchange Comission). The Dodd-Frank Act also 
directs the SEC to set up rules for the registration and reporting of hedge fund managers 
who were previously exempt from registration. By obligatory registration, the SEC may 
collect necessary information in order to curtail those who operate in the “shadows of 
our markets”, prevent fraud, limit systemic risk, and provide information to investors. In 
addition to making registration mandatory, the Dodd-Frank Act requires registered hedge 
fund advisors to file periodic reports (Kaal, 2013).
The EU’s directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) came into effect in 
July 2014, standardising the managers’ operation and defining provisions on selling their 
funds within the European Economic Area. In order to register and to obtain a “passport”, 
the fund managers must enrol in their home jurisdiction. Possessing a passport authorises 
selling funds across the EU. However, not all jurisdictions are favourable for non-EU 
funds: the UK, the Netherlands and Northern European requirements are easier to 
handle, while Southern Europeans are more restrictive. Managers are also discouraged 
by a range of authorisation fees and administrative hurdles.18 Previous UCITS19 passporting 
fees were minimal, and thus charges varying from one member state to the other have 
puzzled several managers. As a result, several US managers are only entering the UK and 
Switzerland, and “waiting for the playing field to settle down”.
4.6 Consumer protection
Before the crisis, on the one hand, low financial literacy on the consumer side and increased 
financial product complexity on the financial service provider side led to consumers who 
felt or were actually misled or taken advantage of. On the other hand, unregulated or 
inadequately supervised financial service providers (with growing conflicts of interest) and 
the spread of misaligned incentives taking into account short-term economic performance 
only, also increased the possibility of consumers facing fraud or abuse (OECD, 2011).
Policymakers seem to have realised that creating a sense of safety for consumers is a basic 
ingredient of any well-operating financial system and that consumer confidence boosts 
growth and innovation over the long term. Therefore developed countries have put 
18 Austria, for example, charges a fee of at least EUR 1,100 (USD 1,409) for processing documents and an annual fee 
of EUR 600 for monitoring compliance. Britain and Hungary, by contrast, do not charge an initial fee, though they 
require fund managers which set up a local branch to pay “periodic” fees (Cohn, 2014, The Reuters article).
19 “UCITS” or “undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities” are investment funds regulated at 
the European Union level. They account for around 75% of all collective investments by small investors in Europe. 
The legislative instrument covering these funds is Directive 2014/91/EU (European Commission, 2014b).
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consumer protection and financial education at the top of their agenda in recent years 
(Chakrabarty, 2013).
Regulatory responses to the regulatory vacuum in the consumer protection system in 
the United States were addressed and treated as a central problem in the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Among other consumer friendly initiatives, the flagship initiative of the Act was to 
create the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2013) to consolidate consumer 
protection powers from seven federal agencies (Puzzanghera, 2011). Although its initial 
steps were hampered by harsh Republican opposition (arguing that the Bureau was given 
too much power and it would limit credit availability and limit consumers’ financial product 
choices), the Bureau is considered a relatively successful agency contributing actively to 
consumer protection (Singletary, 2012).
Consumer protection in the field of financial products in the EU falls within the jurisdiction 
of the new European Supervisory Authorities (Kastner, 2013). These ESAs cooperate with 
national supervisory bodies to protect financial consumers. The European Commission has 
been coming up with consumer-friendly proposals regarding deposit guarantees, a unified 
mortgage lending information sheet for a better comparison of services, stricter regulations 
of complex retail investment products, etc. (European Commission, 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 
2012).
In 2014, the directive ensuring that all European citizens have access to a basic bank 
account was considered a great achievement in the field of consumer protection (EurActiv, 
2014). As Directive 2014/92/EU (the “Payment Accounts Directive”) has been adopted, 
the EU aims to harmonise the opening of bank accounts for European citizens in all 
credit institutions, to make banking fees transparent and to facilitate account switching. 
Consequently, the consumer rights of EU citizens will be improved in the field of (1) access 
to payment accounts, (2) comparability of payment account fees and (3) payment account 
switching. However, making consumer protection and education a central issue when 
reforming the financial system cannot conceal the fact that consumers – even if they are 
financially well-informed – are usually not in a position to dictate certain contractual terms 
(e.g. when taking out a mortgage).
5 Conclusions
In order to stabilise the financial markets, the EU and the US are in the midst of 
a fundamental institutional and regulatory overhaul. The crisis brought into focus the 
interconnections between financial markets and clearly highlighted that regulators, 
supervisors and financial centres across the globe need closer cooperation (Calvino, 2013).
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The US and Europe play a central role in shaping global finance, accounting for more than 
two-thirds of all financial services. Although ties between the two financial markets are 
almost organic, there are several fundamental issues where regulatory frameworks differ. 
Alterations can partly be explained by the different political background and decision-
making mechanisms, but also by diverging attitudes.
The divergence of regulatory schemes is very problematic: corresponding the different 
sets of rules is a time-consuming and money-consuming task (salient administrative costs, 
uncertainties about the future regulations). Both the EU and the United States are well 
aware of disadvantages stemming from the differences in regulation. That is one reason 
why the two entities initiated the regular the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue back 
in 2002. It is obvious that if a country requires adaptation to its financial regulation from 
third countries, it becomes a “rule-maker”. “Rule-takers” adjust to standards set by other 
actors. Therefore, making or taking financial regulation reflects an economic actor’s ability 
to influence others to accept its rules (Quaglia, 2014). In our case, although the EU and 
the United States share similar objectives, they both prefer the role of rule-maker to that 
of passive “downloaders” of rules set by the other. Nevertheless, international agreement 
on cross-border regulatory issues is of fundamental importance: differences represent 
a huge legal and technical challenge for companies operating both in Europe and overseas, 
which have to implement two sets of regulations simultaneously.
The surge in financial regulation activities after the crisis represents a huge opportunity to 
create a more uniform global financial environment. By comparing six exemplary areas of 
the regulatory responses in the US and the EU, we conclude that several rules are inter-
related and have overlapping goals, but that divergence in their implementation poses 
a serious challenge for firms operating in both environments. In some areas, regulators 
have managed to recognise each other’s legal and supervisory framework as equivalent 
through continuous dialogue and cooperation (e.g. credit rating agencies). Regarding other, 
similarly crucial fields, disparities persist (e.g. central counterparties and derivatives).
Consequently, as financial markets continue to integrate, regulators face similar problems 
in the EU and the United States, but their implementation sometimes diverge and differ. 
Regular bilateral cooperation (FMRD) and thoroughly described third-party requirements 
as well as established substituted compliance/equivalence20 procedures point in the right 
direction. Since it is in both jurisdictions’ interest to promote financial firms’ smooth 
cross-border operation, reciprocal recognition of financial rules is hopefully within reach.
20 Substituted compliance: if a relevant body determines that a foreign jurisdiction’s rules are comparable to its 
own rules, it is basically referring to the idea that broad deference should be given to a foreign jurisdiction’s full 
regulatory regime – in lieu of one’s own regulatory regime – so long as it is comparable in its objectives (This 
approach in the EU jargon is referred to as “equivalence” ) CFTC, Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement 
Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (CFTC, 2012).
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